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The main exercise of this paper is to cast some doubt on the use of 
totalitarian model as an analytical tool of Soviet political system. 
The Soviet Union， inspite of its monolithic appearance and the 
claim of homogeneity， has in fact been as complex and variegated as in 
J apan. Political conflict is of the very nature of the functioning of any 
kind of human community， regardless of whether it is open or hiden. 
The main difference between the Soviet Union and the Western 
countries appears to lie in the process of political conflict. The Soviet 
leaders have been making efforts to run the whole society as a single 
organization， inwhich almost no socially significant activities are left to 
autonomously interacting individuals and groups， but instead are man-
aged by centralized， hierarchical agencies， themselves subject to close 
co-ordination， principally by the apparatus of the Party. As in any large 
organization， "market" elements (decision by mutual accommodation 
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and trade offs) occur at many points and at many levels， and there 
is competition， mostly concealed， to further ambitions and concerns 
held individually or shared with others. 
We have examined below empirically to what extent the Supreme 
Soviet organs (equivalent to Western Parliaments) which were insti-
tuted in conformity with the Soviet doctrine of the state could 
accommodate such elements in their processes. However， an attempt 
has been made， first， to define the Soviet doctrine of the state as 
conceived by the Soviets， and then to examine its meaning inρractice 
in the Supreme Soviet organs. 
PART ONE: THE SOVIET DOCTRINE OF THE ST ATE 
1. Definition of the "Doctrine". 
In terms of Marxist-Leninist theory， the raison d'etre of the 
Supreme Soviet organs is closely related to the doctrine of the state. 
Both Marx and Lenin regarded the state as a temporary phenomenon 
which was destined to wither away when the higher stage of socialist 
society， communism， had been achieved. Insofar as the need persists for 
a government apparatus and its ramified system of organization， the 
socialist society is， according to Marxist-Leninist theory， political in 
nature. ("Organization" is understood here as the process of consciously 
guided development of society.) The Party， the soviets， the trade unio・
ns， the cooperatives， the Komsomol and various forms of volunteer 
organization are seen as the particular organizational forms in which 
the people are united and which， intheir totality and interaction， 
comprise the system of political organization of societyl. 
At al stages of development of the socialist state， the soviets as 
part of the political organization are held to be intimately involved in 
the activity of the Soviet state apparatus， which is directed towards the 
accomplishment of the tasks and functions of the dictatorship of the 
working class (the latter has now been superseded by the "state of the 
whole people" according to the 1961 doctrinal change)， and is an 
instrument to transform the old society into a new one， communism2• 
(2 ) 
Part One: The Soviet Doctrine of the State 218 
Since， further， the working class dictatorship is led by its "vanguard"， 
namely， the party， the soviets devote their efforts to implementing the 
laUer's policies. As communist construction progresses， the soviets， 
which combine the features of a government body and a mass organi-
zation of the people， operate more and more like social organizations， 
with the masses participating extensively and directly in their work. 
The soviets， thus， become the basis of communist social self司adminis-
tration3• 
The main underlying principles upon which the soviets are held to 
base their activities are the democratic principle and representative 
principle. 
Dernocratic principle. Soviet theoreticians speak of a gradual 
process of transformation into "communist social self-administration"， 
a process linked with "the creation of the necessary socio-economic 
prerequisites and， above al， with the building of the material and 
technological basis for communism， and -what is exceedingly impor-
tant -with the expansion， by every possible means， ofsocialist democ-
racγand the involvement of al citizens in managing the affairs of 
society"4. 
The notion of democracy， as1 understood it， isa-device for making 
popular control over national government policy in some measure 
practicable for communities too extensive for direct democracy. 1n 
Soviet doctrine， by contrast， socialist democracy means the actual 
sovereignty of people who exercise broad and comprehensive control 
over al state organs， and participate directly in their activities. Thus， 
the Supreme Soviet organs are assigned the task of advancing and 
developing various forms of public participation in state affairs. 1t is 
important to keep in mind that it is this; and not some other， doctrine 
of democracy that has informed the evolution of the Supreme Soviet 
organs. 
Although， as the above implies， Soviet notions of democracy place 
far less emphasis on procedural aspects which tend to be salient in 
Western liberal democracy， such aspects are not treated as totally 
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insignificant， and concern to act (or to appear to act) "democratically"-
may， therefore， be expected to affect such matters as the selection of 
members of the federal and republican Supreme Soviet organs， the 
proceedings of the meetings and the conduct of the operations of the 
Supreme Soviet Organs. 
Representative principle. To bring out the distinctive Soviet 
notion of representation， something should first be said about corre-
sponding Western notions. 
Representation can be defined as a relation between two persons， 
the representative and the represented， with the representative holding 
the authority to perform various actions that incorporate the agree-
ment of the represented. According to Alfred de Grazia， writing 'in the 
International Encycloped勿 01the Social Sciences， "the relation is by no 
means simple， since practically every type of human communication 
and perception can be shown to be intrinsic to representation. The 
relation is socio-psychological. Essentially subjective， itmay， how-
ever， be affected by numerous objective conditions and events". He 
goes on to say that "representation is a concept of social interest 
largely in the contexts of power relations among leaders (represent-
atives) and followers -whether in government， church， school， busi-
ness， or the f臼ami日ly"
usually linked with the notion of democracy. There is， however， no 
agreement among political scientists as to the proper way to secure a 
system of selection which ensures the choice of representatives who 
reflect as completely as possible the varieties of interests and opinions 
among the people. N evertheless， inthe last fifty to one hundred years， 
Western systems such as the British Parliamentary system have 
managed to combine representation， which has come in practice more 
and more to mean pressure group representation， and bureaucratic 
(rational-legal) administration， on the assumption that both pressure 
groups and administrative organs may be organized and interact on the 
basis of interest. Although not al Western political scientists agree 
with this assumption， an increasing number of political scientists in 
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recent years have related the discussion of representation to the role of 
interest group. Be that as it may， this assumtion is alien to the Soviet 
system. What is then the Soviet concept of representation ? 
Soviet scholars claim that the Soviet concept of representation is 
quite different from that of Western bourgeois countries. They specifi-
cally reject the notion that the groups drawn from the society interact 
on the basis of interest. As the Soviet notions of democracy imply， the 
soviets are founded on the masses. Each soviet constitutes social and 
national units of the Soviet society， which reflect the microcosm of the 
laUer6• The masses constitute， therefore; not only industrial workers 
and kolkhozniks， but also al the classes of socialist society， al its 
social strata， al nations and nationalities， al trades and professions， 
men and women， and Party and non-Party members. All these units 
represent not individually but collectively the masses in the soviets7• 
Lenin， following the Marx's formulation， envisaged the Supreme 
Soviet (or its then equivalent， the All-Russian Congress of Soviets) as 
being at al stages in the development towards communism a "working" 
institution largely modelled on the Paris Commune， inwhich the elected 
representatives of the people themselves must work， themselves 
execute their laws， and themselves check up on what becomes of them 
in practice8• Despite the emergence of a vast bureaucratic state 
machine in the meantime， Stalin and Khrushchev continued to use 
similar formulas， as well as Lenin's fortnula that the soviets act as a 
school of administration for the workers， peasants and intelligentia， so
that work on government staffs eventually ceases to constitute a 
profession9• Thus， the idea of elected professional Parliamentarians is 
not compatible with the concept of Soviet representative bodies for-
mulated by Marx， elaborated by Lenin and followed by their heirs. The 
elected deputies to the Supreme Soviet， whether executive， specialist or 
rank and file， are al members of various organizations， through whom 
the Supreme Soviet can perform the legislative functions and execution 
of laws. It is through them that the channeling of the functions of 
administration to different social organizations is supposed to be made， 
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and through them the masses will become "active co-masters of the 
state". 
One should emphasize again that the Supreme Soviet is not a 
legislative body of the kind found in British and American systems， but 
has in theory a variety of legislative， administrative and executive 
functions; its activities are， or appear to be， unduly complex， unavoid-
ably overlapping and deceptively irrationallO from our point of view. 
The Soviet system， though bureaucratic， isbased， formally at least， 
purely on the concept of division of labour， conceived of as a purely 
technical and functional way of distinguishing different sections (for 
managerial purposes) of what is fundamentally al the one socio-eco・
nomic productive process， an approach which assumes a general 
identity of interests. This conception makes it impossible for us to 
assume the differentiations and distinctions that occur in the Soviet 
system as equivalent to those， or even as early forms of those， that 
occur in British and American systems. The independence that is 
fundamental to the articulation and representation of interests， in 
relation to bureaucracy， inthe British and American systems， islacking 
in the Soviet system. That is to say that the concept of representation， 
especially in relation to the administration， isorganized on a different 
principle. 
Finally， itshould be noted here some dynamic aspect of the Soviet 
concept of representation. By the 22nd Congress in 1961， the Soviet 
state is said to have advanced from the "dictator油ipof the proletariat" 
to the second stage termed “the state of al the people". From our point 
of view of studying the Supreme Soviet organs， this docrinal change can 
be expected to have some significance，.since the state of al the people is 
held to express the will and interests of the people as a whole. At present， 
thus， the elected deputies are held to be the most authoritative and re 
spected men and women representing al sections and groups of socie-
tyl， although the actual composition of deputies does not strikingly 
differ from the make-up of deputies before 1961. One could interpret 
nonetheless that the doctrine allows the flexible adaptation of the repre-
(6 ) 
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sentation principle to chartging social conditions. This view has been 
taken by atleast one of the Soviet scholars， YU.A. Tikhomirov. His 
argument may be summarised as follows l2• The process of specialization 
and increasing complexity of management of the economy necessitates 
the broadening of the sphere of application of the principle of representa-
tion so as to express the diversity of socio-economic， organizational and 
other ties in society. However， the view expressed by other scholarsl3 
that the entry of the soviets (the Supreme Soviets and local soviets tak-
en together as a unity) into some particular sphere of administration is a 
desirable prospecf for their activity， isnot acceptable from the practical 
point of view. Instead， he argues that the representative agencies should 
make judgements about al aspects of the socio-economic process， to
see the social ramifications and consequences of the solutions adopted， 
and to guide， co-ordinate and dovetail al the ramified components of 
the administrative apparatus， rather than to concern themselves with 
purely operative-technical day-to-day tasks of administration. 1n order 
to reinforce the position of the soviets along the lines mentioned above， 
he suggests， the following approach should be made: 1) to enlarge the 
sphere of activity of the soviets， 2)to provide them more fully with 
information， 3)to strengthen their connections with .scientific and 
technical institutions， scholars and specialists， 4)to activate further the 
Standing Commissions which make it possible for them to acquire 
gradually the character of leading branch centres of administration， 
closely associated with corresponding government agencies and 5) to 
strengthen ties with production collectives in selecting the candidates of 
the latter for posts as deputies. We are not certain， however， how many 
Soviet scholars agree with the Tikhomirov's view. 
The brief discussion of the Soviet doctrine of the state gives litle 
idea of the theoretical complexities of this problem or the doctrinal 
clashes it has proved over the half century and more of the Soviet 
regime. Since we are confining ourselves to studies of the Supreme 
Soviet organs， we must be content with our attempt to answer a few of 
the questions which have emerged from the outlines of the doctrine， 
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namely: 
1) To what extent have the Supreme Soviet organs been acting as 
"working" institutions? 
2) Does the doctrine truly impel the Soviet leaders to commit 
themselves to constant improvement of the activities of the 
Supreme Soviet organs， orare they motivated by entirely different 
principles litle related to the doctrine itself ? 
3) Are the Supreme Soviet organs acting as transient bodies on 
the way to direct democracy? 
2. "Doctrine" in practice. 
We have observed in our findings that the "doctrine" served as a 
justifying instrument for the actions taken by the Soviet leaders leading 
to the reactivation of the Supreme Soviet organs. Not only the symbolic 
expression of the doctrine， but also the expression of the two principles 
underlying the doctrine were well reflected in the structure and process 
of the Supreme Soviet organs. 
Democratic princiPle. We have established in the previous section 
that the Supreme Soviet organs claim to be democratic and outlined 
how they understand "socialist democracy". It can be said that the 
Supreme Soviet organs provide vehicles for the democratic principle 
thus understood at two levels. 
At one level， the Supreme Soviet organs encourage mass participa-
tion in allegedly government and public affairs by supervising the 
implementation of socialist legality， mass-organizational work， public 
debate on new legislation， and the work of local soviets. We could 
express the view that the activities of the Supreme Soviet organs under 
the banner of socialist democracy were largely meant for public 
mobilization， i.e. to coordinate the activities of other supervisory 
agencies and to mobilize the masses behind the activities of the regime. 
At another level， the Supreme Soviet organs have been involved in 
the democratic norm-setting process. For instance， they seem to have 
taken a direct part in the work of defining the rights and duties of local 
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soviets， the status of deputies in the USSR， and regulations of federal 
and republican Standing Commissionsl4• All these enactments contain 
some provisions incorporating the democratic principle. So far as the 
internal arrangements of the Supreme Soviet organs are concerned， 
these are al defined in democratic forms， and these forms clearly set 
some constraints to the mode of operation of these bodies， even if these 
constraints vary greatly in their impact. For instance， while it is 
plausible that the Standing Commissions actually hold meetings with 
the presence of a simple majority and adopt resolutions by a simple 
majority of members present at the meetings， (though such provisions 
may in fact be applied with less rigour: the Commissions may contact 
members of higher status by telephone and adopt decisions by way of 
forming consensus rather than cut-and-thrust voting， literal conformity 
to provisions such as that the chairmen， deputy chairmen and members 
of the Standing Commissions are appointed by the Chamber of the 
Supreme Soviet is quite inconceivable in terms of the number of 
deputies to be appointed for these posts (e.g.912 Standing Commission 
members at the 8th convocation) at the Supreme Soviet session which 
last merely two to four days. The nomination procedure for each of 
these candidates itself would require a long session. And these have 
never been reported in the press. The above illustration， therefore， casts 
doubt over the actual application of the democratic principle. Despite 
our reservation as to its actual application， the democratic principle 
which has been ensured at two levels， isa necessary instrument in the 
process of institutionalization. Without it， the Supreme Soviet organs 
can neither justify their operations nor maintain a certain degree of 
support for their activities from within and without the Soviet political 
systeロ1.
Retresentativeρrincかle.In the previous section we have discussed 
the Soviet notion of representation in comparison with its Western 
equivalent. We shall briefly outline below the actual practice of 
representation in the Supreme Soviet organs based on our findings. 
The soviet concept of representation based on the doctrine， i.e. the 
(9 ) 
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representatives of the soviets are drawn from al sections of society 
appears to be in practice implemented at the locallevel as well as in the 
Supreme Soviets15• We have also observed that the membership of the 
Supreme Soviet organs have "roots" in the masses. On the surface， this 
fact thus supports the Soviet claim that the soviets are the embodiment 
of the masses， although this does not necessarily support the concept of 
a "working" institution. The Supreme Soviet organs do foster "socialist 
democracyぺaswe have noted earlier， at different levels. We have 
adduced evidence for the formation of closer ties between the represen-
tative bodies and the masses through the operations of the Supreme 
Soviet organs， e.g. local investigations， on-the-spot meetings， imple-
mentation of the nakazy and proposals of the electorates， and public 
debates. 
It shoud be said， however， that the reality of the representation 
turns out at closer consideration to be more complex and untidy， 
dictating a variety of interpretations to make sense of it. We have 
examined representation in the Supreme Soviet organs by referring not 
to the formal electoral arrangements by which the representative is 
elected， but by referring to the extent to which the representatives 
reflect the characteristics of those whom they descriptively represent， 
such as generation， education， nationality， institution， occupational 
position reflecting geographical location， career background， etc. This 
approach had both advantages and disadvantages. One of the advan-
tages was that it has presented us with interesting insights into the 
organizational structure of the Supreme Soviet organs and thus helped 
us to analyse the adual functions of the Supreme Soviet organs. We 
have also observed changes and continuity in the various aspects of 
membership. On the disadvantage side， this approach suggested that 
the .descriptive representation in the Supreme Soviet organs takes a 
plural and mixed form. Thus， the patterns of interactions between the 
represented groups in terms of interest were extremely difficult to 
discern. 
We will now attempt to answer the questions raised in the previous 
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section relating to the Soviet doctrine of the state. 
Though insufficient， the data based on our approach indicated that 
the Supreme Soviet organs have not yet become "working" institutions. 
As we have noted above， the Soviet concept of representation had an 
influence upon the composition of the Supreme Soviet organs. How-
ever， itwas not adequate to explain the actual representation in these 
organs. Therefore， one needs to adduce the Soviet concept of represen-
tation inρractice from our findings. Since this will require a larger 
space， itsuffices to point out here the major deviations from their 
alleged concept. First， the federal and republican Presidia are com-
prised of extremely select people. This is contrary to their claim that 
the Presidia， by their representative character， form a small replica of 
the Supreme Soviets16• On the face of it at least， itis on the Standing 
Commissions which the alleged Soviet concept has exerted more influ-
ence than on the Presidia. This has been particularly noticeable since 
the seventh convocation (1966). When we examined the composition of 
the Standing Commissions a litle further， we have discovered that such 
professions as Party officials (notably obkom first secretary in the case 
of the federal Standing Commissions) had better proportional represen-
tation than the other professions. The equal representational right to 
both sexes can hardly be justified by the fact that the women are in 
numerical terms dominated by men: the ratio being usually two to eight 
in the federal Standing Commissions. It should also be mentioned of the 
fact that not a single woman is， atthe moment， given the rank of obkom 
first secretary. It is the laUer who have been playing， inrecent con-
vocations， a leading role in the federal Standing Commissions by 
heading， for instance， subcommissions of their respective Commissions. 
The second major deviation from the alleged concept is that there 
seems to have been established a division of functions among the 
representatives in the Standing Commissions. 1t is clear from our 
analysis that not every member of the Supreme Soviet organs is called 
upon to perform al the functions which the Supreme Soviet organs 
actually do. True， the rank and file members of the organizations 
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dominated in numerical terms the membership of the Standing Com-
missions_ It is also true that they found their places in relevant Com-
missions: workers engaged in social services in the Commission for 
Social Services; students in the Commission for Y outh Affairs; farm 
workers in the Commission for Agriculture and so on. Their presence 
in these Commissions however evidently meant for legitimation and 
public mobilization. It is equally doubtful as to their actual partci--
pation in the Commissions. V.P.Kazimirchuk and I.V.Pavlov's socio-
logical case study on local soviet deputies reveals that members of 
social groups engaged in production work attend meetings less than 
those of non-production groups， owing to the character of their work: 
working alternate shifts， periods of rush and seasonal work， unavail-
ability of a replacement to do the deputy's regular job， etc l7• One would 
expect in practice that the meetings of the Supreme Soviet organs 
would cause more inconvenience in terms of distance for such members 
than the meetings of the local soviets， although the arrangements have 
now been made under the regulations of Supreme Soviet Standing 
Commissions to ensure their attendance. If this is the case， then the 
publicity given to their appointments as members of the Supreme 
Soviet organs may be aimed at legitimizing the representativeness of 
the Supreme Soviet organs (in order to make it more credible to a more 
sophisticated and better educated public). The functions of adminis-
trative mobilization and interest articulation are likely to be performed 
by the representatives of the important sections of society， i.e. Party 
and government officials， managers of industrial firms， chairmen of 
kolkhozes and directors of sovkhozes， heads of academic and research 
institutions， heads of social and cultural organizations， etc. N one-
theless， the participation of various social groups， albeit restricted， in
the Supreme Soviet organs would， theoretically speaking， help the 
examination， asTikhomirov envisaged， ofthe social ramifications and 
consequences of the solutions adopted by the government. The forms of 
interaction we have observed earlier between and among the different 
groups of representatives， and their limited political consequences in 
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certain areas of state activity and in the processes of actual functions， 
constitute the general elements of the representative principle of the 
Supreme Soviet organs. It thus indicated to us that， while it was obvious 
that the Supreme Soviet organs were not representative bodies in the 
Anglo-American sense， one could not assume aρriori that they did not 
serve what one could legitimately call a representative role. By the 
same token， one could argue that the essence of much of what takes 
place in， say， the British Parliament that one would put under the rubric 
of "representation" can be equally understood in terms other than those 
related to the legislative process， such as communication and mobili-
zation. 
We could speculate that the Soviet leaders are motivated to change 
the organizational structure of these organs by power consideration as 
well as policy issues (decentralization or recentralization of economic 
administration). At the same time， the Soviet leaders may have also 
been motivated by the functional use of these organs. The Supreme 
Soviet organs have actually performed the functions not only of 
legitimizing policy and mobilizing the public behind the regime， but also 
of what Tikhomirov called， guiding， co-ordinating and dovetailing al 
the ramified components of the administrative apparatus: If the Soviet 
leaders share Tikhomirov's view on this point of Soviet "doctrine"， one 
could make the interpretation that their action to reactivate the 
Supreme Soviet organs was derived partly from a doctrinal imperative. 
This will bring us to answer the third question as to whether these 
functions would lead to direct democracy. 
Tikhomirov looks at the future positively by saying.that: 
As specialization proceeds， retention of the social division of 
labour in the realm of administration is not to be excluded even 
in the future. But it will naturally be based on new principles that 
reflect a new stage in socio-economic development: . 
There is a new factor in the process of transition from organi-
zational separation in the systems of state agencies: al state 
agencies are coming to resemble each other more closely on the 
(13) 
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basis of the introduction of common democratic methods in their 
activity and the principles of representative and direct democ-
racy. As a consequence of the increasing interdependence of the 
various spheres of the life of society and the state， and the 
entirely natural processes of differentiation and concentration of 
various functions and phenomena， we see a closer functional 
resemblance between the various state agencies. Without losing 
their distinctive characteristics， they are... developing and 
improving those ties and relationships that give the entire state 
apparatus the quality of a single， purposeful， operative mecha-
nism四
Thus Tikhomirov foresees the introduction of direct democracy as 
a necessary element in the developmental process 0ぱfstate agencies. The 
question whether the realization of direct democracy is a part of the 
social division of labour requires careful examination and can only be 
answered by empirical studies on this problem. "Doctrine" will be 
served as the ideal for the future development of the state. It must be 
noted， however， that the doctrine could serve the Soviet leaders as a 
political instrument. They have indeed in the past readily sought 
justification for their action to reactivate the Supreme Soviet organs in 
the doctrine. Action based on the doctrine， whatever its real motives， 
could demonstrate to the masses that the leaders are doctrinally 
committed to the destined course. 
PART TWO: INTERACTION OF INDIVIDUALS 
1. Interest Articulation in the Supreme Soviet Organs. 
Interest articulation presupposes the existence of groups whose 
members are concerned to advance their shared interests， often in 
competition with these of other groups. Yet， we have observed that the 
"Doctrine" specifically reject the notion that the individuals and groups 
interact on the basis of interest. However， in order to sensitize 
ourselves to possible interest articulation in the Supreme Soviet organs， 
we may hypothesize the existence of four types of groups operating in 
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these bodies: namely， 1)functional groups; 2) echelon groups; 3) social 
groups; and 4) institutional groups. The first refers to professional 
groups such as teachers， engineers， academics， doctors， artists and 
administrative (functional) officials. Echelon groups refer to a:dminis-
trative levels， and these in turn may reflect geographical and ethnic 
differences. The third type of group refers to broad social groups such 
as workers， farmers， office workers， students and pensioners. The final 
type refers to institutional interest groups such as Party， TUC， Police 
and Military19. 
One might hypothesize that al these collectivities or "groups" 
based on divisions or levels of the formal structures may advace their 
shared interests through their co-opted fellow members in the processes 
of legislation and implementation of acts and through the processes of 
legitimation， communication and mobilization. Indeed， some of the 
functions of the Supreme Soviet organs such as communication may 
serve the role of reconciling differences of interest in addition to 
furthering particular group interests. For instance， the differences of 
interest between the centre and lower levels and between the admin-
istratively responsible members of the political elite may be reconciled 
in the process of communication. Certainly， there is abundant evidence 
of unconcerted interests which require reconciliation between and 
among the groups. 
Apart from the interests of the collectivities mentioned， the inter-
ests of additional informal groups also deserve consideration. For 
instance， one aspect of the mobilization process in the Supreme Soviet 
may be to help the centre to nip "localism" (mestnichestvo) in the bud. 
Local patronage tends to grow around the first secretaries of district， 
regional and republican Party committees20• The politics of collusion 
among officials subordinate to different echelons， but working in the 
same locality is not the monopoly of the Soviet political system. The 
French have long experienced this phenomenon in the relations between 
the central government and regional prefects21• In a vertical society↓ 
such as ]apan， the formation of informal groups centred on influential 
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men is considered to be a natural phenomenon2. InIndia， the theory of 
moving top officials of local administration around in order to prevent 
contamination by contacts which are likely to be established in any 
particular city or region appears on the surface to achieve its purpose23 
. There is no need here to discuss other types of informal groups whose 
interests may be advanced or reconciled in the Supreme Soviet organs， 
but this example is given to indicate that we should be alert to 
indications of such informal group activity in exploring our data. 
Of course， an individual member may not exclusively "belong" to 
one group， because of his multiple career background in different 
organizations and regions， and also because he may shift his group 
identity depending on the questions at issue. We should also bear in 
mind that the furtherance of group interests may be pursued 
"esoterically" and "parasitically" upon the performance of other， 
legitimate activities， i.e. assigned tasks24. Thus， for the outside ob-
server， it may be extremely difficult to generalize about the dimensions 
of group politics deployed in the sittings of Supreme Soviet organs. 
Because it was difficult to characterize even the aggregate group 
and its role in the formation of policy， Franklyn Griffiths emphasized 
issues rather than groups， the process of tendency conflict on these 
issues rather than the conflict of structures invested with purposes and 
power of their own. He suggests，therefore， that: 
(16) 
Given the condition of system-dominance in Soviet society， itis to 
be assumed that certain dominant tendencies of articulation will 
emerge from the total system of interaction and form effective 
alternate directions of policy. On the basis of the available evi-
dence， then， the investigator will have to make a judgement as to 
which patterns of articulation represent effective variants of policy 
on the issue in question. The Soviet policy-making process is thus 
to be regarded as one in which interaction among participants at 
different levels of the political structure generates a conflict of 
dominant tendencies of articulation， through which alternate lines 
of policy are identified， authoritatively decided， and implemented 
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with regard to specific values. To state this in another way， policy 
on a given issue is likely to be internally contradictory and may be 
understood as the interaction among conflicting tendencies of 
articulation prior to， during， and after the taking of official 
decisions; similarly fluctuations in value allocation or in the policy 
"line" may be seen as shifts in the relative influence of conflicting 
tendencies2S• 
We should， therefore， seek to investigate how far the Supreme 
Soviet organs articulate group interests in the process of their activities 
and/or how far some of their processes may be seen rather as con-
tributing to the articulation of tendencies in Griffiths' sense. 
2. "Interest Articulation" in practice. 
Evidence of the efforts to use the Supreme Soviet organs for the 
articulation of group interests has come to light in our observation of 
th，e communication mechanism. The Presidia， intheir role as organizers 
of the Standing Commissions， seems to be one arena among others (and 
admittedly far from the most important) within which different 
agencies and localities compete for resources. The local executive 
committees receive instructions from the higher auth0rities， such as the 
ministries， to fulfil particular tasks， and also from the republican 
Presidia to remove shortcomings in their performances. The ministries 
may give instructions directly to the local Party committees as well， 
although they are not supposed to. It is always a major problem for 
local leaders to find the resources to meet these obligations. The 
Supreme Soviet mechanism seems to have been developing as a further 
avenue for local leaders to press their claims for larger resources. 
Almost al the first secretaries of regional Party committees in the 
USSR are now represented in the federal Standing Commissions26• The 
evidence shows that they can fight at the sittings of the Standing 
Commissions for higher appropriations of social-welfare funds at least. 
We also saw a glimpse of allocation politics in the communication 
process of the Standing Commissions. Meetings of the Presidia may 
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also provide the entire membership of the Presidia with opportunities 
for getting relevant information and perhaps lobbying for the further-
ing of the current concerns of their own organizations. 
We have also seen that functional groups， echelon groups， social 
groups and institutionaJ groups interact with one another in the per-
formance of those organs' formal functions (i.e. legislative and super-. 
visory functions). It is hard to determine， however， that these groups 
interact with one another consistently on the basis of interest. As 
anticipated in the previous section， our data were not sufficient to 
generalize about the dimensions of group politics involved in the 
sittings of the Supreme Soviet organs. Taking this fact into considera-
tion， one might have recourse to Franklyn Griffiths' 日Tendency
analysis" and examine its applicability to the Supreme Soviet organs. It 
should be remembered， however， that Griffiths postulates a "loose 
coalition of actors" whose articulations regardin，g areas of policy 
manifest a shared "tendency" differing from the "tendencies" of other 
such coalitions. He also speaks of inter-"tendency" conf1ict. Griffiths 
wants us to identify such things as differences of emphasis imply-
ing alternative policy "thrustsぺthe"groups" concerned typically cut-
ting across existing structural boundaries. Again， our supporting 
evidence was so weak that the effort to generalize the articulation of 
conf1icting tendencies in the Supreme Soviet organs. can hardly be 
regarded as rewarding. Even if one finds cases that make sense 
interpreted in Griffiths' terms， itis safe to assume that the Supreme 
Soviet organs are not the major setting for articulation of tendencies 
within the Soviet political system. To put it briefly， the Supreme Soviet 
organs may be operating as one of the less important media for both the 
articulation of individual demands and the articulation of tendencies. 
What we propose to conjecture here is， therefore， the process of 
articulation operating in the Supreme Soviet organs. For this， we shall 
make partial use of Griffiths' analysis. 
Griffiths divided the participants into three types: political elite; 
intermediate actors; and lower participants. An act of communication， 
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in which an expectation is conveyed by one participant to another， 
takes place between these participants. Griffiths also stated that an 
"increasing number of intermediate participants27 are engaged in the 
governmental process. Policy continues to be made in a highly 
organized context， but informal participation by members of the 
intermediate structure is serving increasingly to shape the situation in 
which the political elite acts"28. These "intermediate participants" 
broadly correspond with the Group (the second echelon of the Party and 
government hierarchy) of our analysis of the communication process in 
the Standing Commissions29. Itwould thus be expedient to depict the 
entire articulation process operating in the federal Supreme Soviet 
organs by outlining the involvement of this Group in this process‘ 
In many instances the federal and republican Presidia， usually 
acting as an arm of the "collective leadership"， selected a particular 
locality for evaluation and inforced new or old legislative decrees and 
decisions. Thus， the wishes of the "collecitve leadership" on an issue at 
a given moment have been authoritatively transmitted through the 
Presidia to the local government organs. On the face of it， the latter 
appeared to have accepted the demands of the Presidia. If， on the other 
hand， itwere not practicable to implement these demands，they would 
then consult and even lodge their complaints with their local political 
leaders， namely first secretaries of regional Party committees. We 
should recall here that almost al first secretaries of regional Party 
committees in the USSR are now represented in the federal Standing 
Commissions. One should also recall that one of the supervisory 
operations of the Standing Commissions is to reappraise on-going 
co-ordination programmes in the light of their consequences and to 
adjust the existing policies incrementally. Therefore， the first secretary 
of a regional Party committee may further his own individual expec-
tations at sittings of the Standing Commissions. A first secretary wil do 
so at first at sub-commission level， by making use of his own infor-
mation and by deploying his own professional expertise and operational 
control of the body， i.e. as head of a sub-commission. At the meetings 
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of the Commission， he may attempt to effect the convergence of the 
expectations of others， by allying himself with similar expectations of 
the members of other Groups. On the other hand， there is a danger of 
his expectations being neutralized by the intervention .of higher Party 
officials. Nevertheless， after the interactions between participants at 
the different levels in the Commissions， the latter adopts the recom-
mendations which are to be directed at the relevant government bodies. 
1n the process of the policy-adjustment by the latter， the recom-
mendations of the Commisson may be examined as a source of material 
to which they are morally obliged to refer. The revised policy which 
was drafted by the government bodies and approved by the "collective 
leadership" may again be transmitted as the demad of the latter at a 
given moment to the local government bodies through the Presidia. 
Thus， the process may be called. a circular process of articulation 
operating in the Supreme Soviet organs. The articulating activities 
which we have observed in the communication process lends support to 
this process. However， this process is a part of extensive processes of 
articulation of conflicting individual demands and/or conflicting tend-
encies operating in the Soviet political system. On the other hand， it was 
obvious from our studies that conflicting individual demands and/or 
conflicting tendencies were not articulated (not publicly at any rate) in 
the Standing Commissions on foreign affairs. Articulation of conflicting 
individual demands and/or conflicting tendencies in the Supreme 
Soviet organs is confined to particular areas of state activity such as 
everyday services， public eating facilities， housing and school construc-
tion， pubic health， education， etc. Nevertheless， the circular articulating 
process is capable of throwing light on developments in the areas 
mentioned above， thus assisting the Soviet political system to adapt 
itself to the changing environment. 
Conclusion 
The Supreme Soviet organs came into operation in 1938， but 
existed for a long time in a virtually moribund state. 1t is only over the 
last fifteen years that new life has clearly been breathed into this 
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apparently moribund structure. The Supreme Soviet organs appear to 
have now reconstituted their structure and processes， permitting new 
functions， values and techniques to be introduced， diffused and assimi-
lated. 
The Soviet political system， particularly under Stalin， was suited to 
attain for a limited set of priority goals such as industrialization， 
defence and collectivization. However， the changing environment， 
socio-economic environment in particular， affected the heavily circum-
scribed Soviet political system. The Soviet political system has 
expanded its capacity to cope with multiplying demands for infor-
mation， decisions， and co-ordination， causing pressures for some 
democratic elements in the system. One of the responses to such 
pressures was the reactivation of the Supreme Soviet organs. Con-
sequently， the interpretations of the "Doctrine" by the Soviets have 
become diverse. We have already discussed Tikhomirov's views on the 
"Doctrine" of the state which represent a departure from conventional 
views on the "Doctrine". 
The Supreme Soviet organs have therefore expanded and legiti-
!mized the administrative and participatory roles. The Supreme 
Soviet organs' administrative role is derived from the nature of the 
Soviet system as one which seeks to link up organizationally the var-
ious sectors of society through the duplication and overlapping of 
functions and the multiplication and interweaving of offices -partic-
ularly the Party， government and economic apparatuses. The partici-
patory role of the Supreme Soviet organs related to the much-discussed 
question of the devolution of policy-making in the Soviet Union since 
the death of Stalin. Consequently， the types of individuals and groups 
who could exert an influence on the making of policy have spread out 
considerably， ifnot evenly al sections of the society. However， one 
should bear in mind， first， that the chief participants in the processes of 
articulation are evidently the executive and administrave officials and 
specialists rather than special groups in the public at large. Secondly， 
interaction between and among the different groups of representatives 
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in the Supreme Soviet organs secure only limited political consequences 
in non-sensitive issues. Sectional groups cannot organize overtly to push 
their interests on sensitive issues. Nevertheless， the federal and repub-
lican Supreme Soviet organs as a whole provide circular two-way 
transactions for the articulation of particularistic demands and indi-
vidual attitudes and perhaps also the articulation of tendencies. 
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